Chris wrote: Dan wrote: Chris wrote: Dan wrote: Chris wrote:
True, lets get back on subject.
If there were not enough fans there to cause a crush and a crush happened you must be wrong.
The crush was caused because the police didn't direct people away from the over-crowded pens.
They opened gates to let people out of those pens Dan.
Then more Liverpool fans forced their way IN those gates which made it worse.
You haven't got a clue.
There was a crush outside, the police opened the gates to allow more though (later Duckenfield claimed that Liverpool fans had broken down the gates). However, what they didn't do was direct fans away from the over-crowded pens, into the emptier pens either side. All pens would have held the number that was there. The fatal error was keeping fans out of the over-crowded areas.
Read some of the survivors stories, then you'll have an idea what happened.
I find it crazy how so many Liverpool fans forget the main point of the crush. Fans without tickets force their way into the ground through gates opened to let people OUT.
Why is that obvious fact and cause of the crush pushed aside? Because it can't be the poor fans fault.. has to be the police.
The police should have had this sorted out and the authorites could have put the kick off back and let people know what was happening, not open a gate and then let the fans into the already full pens, in which police were not there to tell these people that those pens were full and thats what always happened at Hillsborough and thats what was suppost to happen, and did you know that the pen should have had less fans in it anyway. And why did they also give Liverpool and their fans the small end of Hillsborough and give Nottingham forest the large Kop end of the ground, when Liverpool had average crowds of 40,000 plus and Forest had an average of like 20,000.
I went to football games back then and the games i went to like Scotland v England when there was like 66,000 plus and i actually think there was probably close to 70,000 plus at that game and i went to a Rangers v Celtic game and there was 74,000 plus at that game and i went to others, and things could have also went wrong at these games with the overcrowding, but guess what the police let you no who was in charge when i went to these games.
And another thing before you got near these grounds loads of people were turned back if they did not show their tickets and ive had to show i had a ticket or it would have me being sent away from the ground, and for what ive read about Liverpool's European cup finals and other big games you had no chance of getting near the grounds without a ticket.
The Stadium - Grounds for Concern 1981, FA Cup Semi Final, Spurs v Wolves: Spurs had a larger average gate than Wolves yet were allocated the much smaller Leppings Lane end, resulting in 38 Spurs fans sustaining crush injuries. Police helped fans out of the enclosure. So concerned was the FA that it moved such games from Hillsborough for six years.
In spite of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club (SWFC) having altered the terrace design to five pens, there was documented evidence of crushing in the pens during the 1987 and ‘88 semi-finals (para 1 Interim Taylor Report [ITR]).
1988 & ’89 FA Cup Semi Finals: Liverpool FC challenged the decision to allocate Leppings Lane to their fans; in ‘88 due to allocation size, whereas the ‘89 objection was due to the complaints of crushing that fans had experienced in ‘88. South Yorkshire Police(SYP)refused to switch ends (para 36 ITR).
The Pens The official capacity of the central pens was estimated at 2,000. The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) later found that should have been reduced to 1,600 as the crush barriers didn’t conform to ‘The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds 1986’. Approx 3,000 Liverpool fans were in these pens by kick off. BBC commentator, John Motson, specifically mentions the emptier wing Pens.
The police had also noted the uneven distribution & overcrowding; a tannoy announcement was made for fans in the central pens to move forward to make room for others (para 59 ITR). At no point did police attempt to close the central pens and filter fans into the wing areas.
Common practice was for the doors at the tunnel head to be closed once police estimated the central pens were full, with remaining fans to be directed to the outer pens.
This was Chief Superintendent Duckenfield’s first time in charge of policing such a big game; no such forethought to follow established protocol was given as he gave the order to open Exit Gate C. Earlier that afternoon, CI Creaser asked Superintendent Murray whether the pens should be filled one-by-one, but was told that they should all be available and the fans should 'find their own level'(para 58 ITR).
The Supporters’ Experiences LFC supporters attribute the Disaster to a failure of police control and lack of communication and organisation (para 223/4/5 ITR).
All 23 turnstiles for the 24,256 LFC fans were situated at the Leppings Lane End, with just 7 for the 10,100 terraces fans. By contrast, NFFC’s 29,800 fans had access to 60 turnstiles, running the length of the ‘Kop’ End and South Stand (para 187 ITR).
The ITR makes several references to the allocations, information printed on the tickets, the confusing layout of the stadium and poor sign-posting as all being contributory factors to the formation of large crowds outside the turnstiles. The decision not to pre-filter fans ahead of the turnstiles, as was done the previous year, is also criticised. This measure would have allowed fans with ‘Seated’ and'Standing’ tickets to be filtered properly and given accurate directions. Lord Taylor criticised the decision to open Gate C, as opposed to delaying the kick-off. Two police officers are noted as informing Duckenfield that they couldn't get all the fans inside the ground by 3pm and that they should therefore delay kick-off. Their objections were noted but rejected (para 62 & 65 ITR).
Lord Taylor believes that even if the allocation had been switched the outcome could have well been the same (para 272 ITR). This underlines the importance of effective crowd control in a stadium with disproportionate access points.
Taylor also criticised SWFC, their safety engineers and the local authority, which had failed to issue an up-to-date licence for the stadium. But he directed his most damning conclusions towards the SYP. Most pertinently, the ITR categorically dismissed all theories of bad behaviour, drunkenness and ticketless LFC fans as a contributing factor to the Disaster and subsequent loss of police control.
